In lunary-ai/lunary version v1.4.28, the /bigquery API route lacks proper access control, allowing any logged-in user to create a Datastream to Google BigQuery and export the entire database. This includes sensitive data such as password hashes and secret API keys. The route is protected by a config check (`config.DATA_WAREHOUSE_EXPORTS_ALLOWED`), but it does not verify the user's access level or implement any access control middleware. This vulnerability can lead to the extraction of sensitive data, disruption of services, credential compromise, and service integrity breaches.
The /bigquery route is protected only by configuration checking (`config.DATA_WAREHOUSE_EXPORTS_ALLOWED`), but it does not verify user permission levels nor apply any access control middleware. As a result, any authenticated user — regardless of their role — can invoke the endpoint and initiate a Datastream export of the full database contents to Google BigQuery. The absence of an authorization mechanism (CWE-862) means that merely having an active session is sufficient to perform this operation.
An attacker can export the entire application database, gaining access to sensitive data such as password hashes and secret API keys, leading to credential compromise, service integrity violation, and potential disruption of its operation.
Apply the patch available in the vendor's repository (commit a8d7b2959e87c30fbafdb12af7ffa093385dcc60) or update the application to a version containing the fix according to vendor references.
Lunary version v1.4.28
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HLunary
APPLunary1.4.28
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